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THE MAGAZINE. With this issue THE LAW REGISTER appears in
-a new.cover. In order to preserve uniformity in the bound volume,
other changes, designed to improve the appearance of the magazine,
are postponed till the beginning of the year. An effort will be
made to furnish correspondingly improved reading matter, with
respect both to articles of permanent value to the profession, and to
important questions of contemporary legal interest. Attention is
.directed also to the change of address to which business commu-
nications should be sent, and to the reduced subscription price.
The latter change.has been in contemplation for some time, and is
-one which we are glad to be able at last to make in order to ensure
:a wider circulation. As an added inducement to new subscribers,
.allsubscriptions received at any time before the close of the year, and
,paid for in advance, will be dated from January 1, 1897.
CERTIFICATION BY SECRETARY OF STATE OF NOMINATIONS UNDER
'THE "AUSTRALIAN BALLOT LAWS." In the recent case of Pheosv.
i.per [AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW, 1896, p. 523], the
Supreme Court of Nebraska has followed the general trend of the
decisions thus far rendered, that the Secretary of State will not
decide which of two rival conventions of the same organization is
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the regular one. In the case in question the facts briefly were that
two conventions had met and made nominations for state offices,
which nominations had been certified in due form to the Secretary
of State. Both sets of nominations were under the same party
name, wherein arose the contention.
The court held that the question in such instance, which faction.
is the true representative of the party organization, is political
rather than judicial, and that all such nominations should be recer-
tified to the county clerks. This ruling is supported by State v.
Allen, 43 Neb. 651, 62 N. W. Rep. 35; Peop~le v. District Court,
18 Colo. 26, 31 Pac. Rep. 339; Shields v. Jacob, 88 Mich. 164,
50 N. W. Rep. 105. It appears that the decision of such a case is
one for the people. The court said: "The legislature has not
provided any means for determining such controversies. [It is a
question whether the legislature has such power.] Political parties
are voluntary associations for political purposes. They establish
their own rules. They are governed by their own usages. Voters,
may form them, reorganize them, and dissolve them at their will.,
The voters ultimately must determine every such question. The
voters constituting a party are, indeed, the only body who can fin-
ally determine between contending factions or contending organi-
zations. The question is one essentially political, and not judicial
in its character. It would be alike dangerous to the freedom of
elections, the liberty of voters, and to the dignity and respect
which should be entertained for judicial tribunals, for the courts to.
undertake in any case to investigate either the government, usages,.
or doctrines of political parties, and to exclude from the official
ballots the names of candidates placed in nomination by an organi-
zation which a portion or, perhaps, a large majority, of the voters
professing allegiance to the particular party believe to be the 'repre-
sentatives of its political doctrines, and its party government."
See the late case of People v. Lauterbach, 39 N. Y. Suppl. ii19,
AM. LAW. REG. & REV., 1896, p. 578. The above cases rule
where the nominations have been certified and no objections made
to the certificates within the specified times. Courts will by no
means, however, pass over fraud and unfairness in the conduct of
caucuses and conventions.
LIABILITY OF A PUBLIc TREASURER FOR MONEYS LOST WITHOUT-
NEGLIGENCE ON His PART. The reports for the past few months
contain several cases which add to the conflict of opinion already
existing upon this question. Do the statutes creating the office and
prescribing the duties thereof, together with the official bond re-
quired of the officer, increase the common law liability of the
treasurer as a bailee for hire and make him an insurer against loss.
not occasioned by the act of God or of the public enemy?
The question first arose in United States v. Prescott, 3 How. 589
(1845). The question certified to the Supreme Court of the United
States by the evenly divided Circuit Court for Illinois, was "Does.
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the felonious stealing of public moneys in the custody of a receiver
of public moneys without fault . . . . on his part, discharge him
and his sureties, and is that a good and valid defence on his official
bond? " The court, speaking by McLean, J., answered the ques-
tion in the negative, saying "The liability of the defendant,
Prescott, arises out of his official bond, and upon principles which
are founded upon public policy." And again, "Public policy
requires that every depositary of the public money should be held
to strict accountability. Not only should he exercise the highest
degree of vigilance but ' he should keep safely' the moneys which
come to his hands." Taney, C. J., Story, Nelson and Swayne, JJ.,
took part in this decision. The doctrine of strict accountability
has not been departed from by the Supreme Court of the United
States, as some have supposed; for in United States v. Thomas, 15
Wall. 345 (1872), the majority of the court, by Mr. Justice
Bradley, say that such is the policy of the Acts of Congress. In
placing the liability of such officers, Mr. Justice Bradley said,
"They are special bailees, subject to special obligation. It is
obvious that the ordinary law of bailment cannot be invoked to.
determine the degree of their responsibility. This is placed on a
new basis. To the extent of their official bonds, it is fixed by
special contract." From this opinion Mr. Justice Miller strongly
dissented. In an early Pennsylvania case, Co1. v. Co1', 3 Pa.
St. 372 (1846), Mr. Chief Justice Gibson used the following lan-
guage in reversing the judgment appealed from: "The responsi-
bility of a public receiver is determined not by the law of bailment,
whicl is called in to supply the place of a special agreement where
there is none, but by the condition of his bond. The condition of
it in this instance was ' to account for and pay over' the moneys to
be received, and we look in vain for a power to relieve him from
the performance of it." This case has been repeatedly followed in
Pennsylvania: Baiy v. Coin., 2o W. N. C. 221; Nrason v. Direc-
tors, 24 W. N. C., 6o (1889).
Of the cases recently reported, State v. Copeland, 34 S. W.
(Tenn.) 427 (1896), where money.was lost by the failure of a.
bank, and Cit, v. Afielligan, 45 Pac. (Cal.) 337 (1896), where a
city treasurer was robbed, hold that where the officer is free from
fault, proof of these facts will constitute a valid defence; while in
Fairchild v. ffedges, 44 Pac. (Wash.) 125 (1896), it was held
that the officer was liable for the safety of the public moneys even
though he was not negligent. In this case and in Board v. Jewel,
44 Minn. 427, 46 N. W. 914, the authorities for both views will be
found, the great weight of opinion, however, favoring the doctrine
of strict accountability.
LATERAL SUPPORT OF LAND. Cabot v. Kingnan, 44 N. E. Rep.
344; Supreme Judicial Court of Mass. This case, which was
noticed in the August issue of this magazine under Progress of the
Law, presents an interesting point for discussion, namely, whether
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where the strata of certain soil are of a liquid nature such soil is
entitled to support by the adjacent land. A city built a sewer in a
public street opposite the plaintiff's premises. Extending under
both the street and the plaintiff's land was a stratum of silt, and
fine sand mixed with water, or quicksand. -The sewer trench was
kept free of water by means of buckets and pumps, which at the
same time removed large quantities of the quicksand that flowed in
from beneath the plaintiff's soil ; this deprived the surface of the
necessary support and caused it to crack and sink, damaging the
plaintiff's houses thereon.
The court held the city liable in damages, for depriving the
plaintiff of the lateral support to his land, in consequence of which
the quicksand flowed out and the surface soil sank ; and said it was
the duty of the defendants to prevent this. But how they could
possibly have prevented it, is not apparent.
Three justices dissented from this decision, on the authority of
Pop plewell v. Hodkinson, 4 L. R. Exch. 248; which decides that
there is no common law right to the support of land by subterran-
ean water; and that no damages can be recovered for the sinking
of land so supported, resulting from excavations and drainage in
adjoining lands. They argued that a quicksand, flowing so freely
as to be raised by a pump, ought to come within the application of
this rule regarding percolating water, and that its drainage by the
defendants' sewer-trench was no wrong.
It is submitted that this view is the more sound on principle
The right to the support of land by adjoining tracts "stands on
natural justice, and is essential to the protection and enjoyment of
property in the soil. Although it places a restraint on what a man
may do with his own property, it is in accordance with the precept,
"sic utere tuos ut alienum non laedas:" fumphries v. Brogden,
12 A. & E. n. s. 743. But when this right becomes injustice to
the owners of adjoining lands by imposing upon them unreasonable
restrictions, and leads to practical confiscation of their property for
my private benefit, it should cease. It is intended simply to
prevent an owner of land from excavating it so close to the boun-
daries of adjoining estates as to cause them to cave in: "If the
neighboring owners might excavate their soil on every side up to
the boundary line to an indefinite depth, land thus deprived of
support on all sides could not stand by its own coherence alone: "
Gale on Easements, 216. But it should not operate to prevent
all excavation by the owner upon penalty of heavy damages
to his neighbors. Yet this is a direct result of the decision
under consideration ; for, in cases like Popplewell v. Hodkinson,
no matter on what part of the land the excavation were made, and in
cases like the present, however carefully the trench be shored up, it
would certainly displace the liquid stratum of the adjoining land
and render the excavator liable in damages. For these reasons, we
think the rule stated in Popplewell v. Hodkinson should have been
applied to the present case ; and that the right of the owne of
NOTES.
land to lateral support should not extend to liquid strata beneath
that land.
INDORSEMENTOF DRAFT To FIcTITIOUS INDORSEE. In an unusually
well considered opinion upon the effect of an indorsement of a
draft to a fictitious person when the indorser is ignorant of the
fictitious character of the indorsee or payee, the Supreme Court of
Tenn., per Beard, J., in Chism v. -irst Nat. Bank, 36 S. W. 387,
43 Cent. L. J. 192 (1896), after referring to Mr. Randolph's
adverse criticism of Mr. Daniel's statement of the rule, properly
concludes in the language of O'Brien, J., in the leading case of
Shinan v. Bank, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. Rep. 371, that "the
maker's intention is the controlling consideration which determines
the character of such paper. It cannot be treated as payable to
bearer unless the maker knows the payee to be fictitious and actu-
ally intends to make the paper payable to a fictitious person."
Chism, the plaintiff, indorsed a draft to one Hamilton, a ficti-
tious person, but supposing him "to be real; a third person fraudu-
lently indorsed the name of this fictitious indorsee and collected
the draft from the defendant bank. Chism sued the bank for the
face of the draft, on the ground that it had been paid to one who
derived title through a forged endorsement, and was met with the
defence that the endorsement to a fictitious person was in law an
indorsement to bearer, and that therefore the payment to the holder
without notice discharged the drawee.
The question has rarely arisen in the American courts. In Kohn
v. WVatkins, 26 Kan. 691, the court, relying on the rule as stated
by Daniel, decided in favor of the contention of the present defend-
ants. In England the plaintiff in such case is permitted to recover.
The courts of New York and Ohio have adopted the English rule:
Shzpnan v. Bank (suipra) ; Armstrong" v. Baker, 46 0. St. 512,
22 N. E. Rep. 866; and Tennessee has now followed these courts.
It is obvious that the conclusion of the court is correct and con-
sistent with the law of negotiable paper, for the banker is liable to
the maker if he pays to any one who derives title through a forged.
indorsement. "Then," as the court says, "in a case where the
drawer has been guilty of no wrong, but innocently issues or
indorses his check or bill to a person believing him to be real, and
a third party, without authority, writes the name of this fictitious
payee or indorsee upon it, and by this fraud succeeds in collecting
it, why should the drawee, by payment of such indorsement, dis-
charge himself from liability to the drawer ?"
The distinction maintained by the English cases is the true one;
when the drawer makes his bill payable to a fictitious payee with
knowledge, his bill is in law payable to bearer ; but where the payee
or indorsee is a fictitious person, and this fact is not known to the
maker or indorser, the latter is not estopped even as against a bona
fide holder. See Byles on Bills, 149, n. 6.
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CONSTRUCTION OF WILL-LIFE ESTATE-POWER OF DISPOSAL.
The question as to whether a devise of an estate generally, coupled
with a power of disposal, passes a fee or only a life estate, has once
more been the subject of judicial interpretation by the Supreme
Court of Connecticut in the case of Mansfield v. Shelon, 35
Atlantic Reporter, 27 1. The provisions of the will, which came
up for construction in the case, were as follows : "All the rest and
residue of my estate, both real and personal and wherever situated,
I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, to be used and
appropriated by her, as much as she may wish for her happiness,
without any restrictions or limitations whatsoever," followed by a
clause that after the death of the wife, and the payment of her
debts, and the settlement of her estate, whatever property should
remain should pass to a trustee for final distribution as directed.
The court decided that only a life estate vested in the widow of the
testator, and in arriving at the conclusion discussed in an extended
opinion a great many authorities on the subject.
From an examination of these cases several conclusions can be
deduced as to the exact status of the law :
I. That where a primary gift conveys and vests in the first taker
an absolute interest in personal, or an absolute fee simple in real,
property, it exhausts the entire estate so that there can be no valid
remainder.
2. That where a life estate is expressly created, it will not be
converted into a fee, absolute or qualified, or into another form of
estate greater than a life estate, merely by reason of there being
coupled with it a power of disposition, however general or
extensive.
3. Though an express gift in fee will not be reduced to a life
estate by mere implication from a subsequent gift over, it may be
so reduced by subsequent language clearly indicating intent and
equivalent to a positive provision.
4. Under these limitations, and at times apparently infringing
upon them, the intention of the testator as ascertained from the
instrument, and, where necessary, by careful extrinsic evidence,
governs the interpretation of such provisions.
An example of the first of these principles is the case of Metho-
dist Church v. Harris, 62 Conn. 93 (1892). In that case the
testator bequeathed his property to his wife "and her heirs forever,
and after her death such of it as might remain to the Methodist
Church," and in deciding that the widow took the estate absolutely
the court said that the testator had made a bold attempt to limit a
fee upon a fee which the court would not allow.
The case of Lewis v. Pahner, 46 Conn. 454 (i88o), aptly
illustrates the second of these principles. In that case a testator
gave "to his sister S., the use of all the rest of his real estate dur-
ing her natural life and for her to dispose of it as she may think
proper or just. The language of the court was as follows: "While,
as a rule, the gift or devise of property generally, with power to
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"to sell, and no subsequent limitation carries an estate in fee, never-
theless, there is no case where a life estate expressly created was
enlarged to a fee by a power of sale. There are cases where there
is an apparent life estate with power of disposal, without any dis-
position of the remainder, in which it is held that the devisee takes
a fee. There are other cases where there is a devise of an estate
generally, with an express power to sell, in which it is held that
the devise over of the remainder is void for repugnancy. But we
think none of the cases go so far as to disregard the obvious and
acknowledged intention of the testator. All regard that, when
discovered, as conclusive."
In Gloverv. Stillson, 56 Conn. 316 (1889), the devise was "to P.
and M., for the term of their natural lives, with power to dispose of
any portion of the estate, if they might so desire," and after their
decease a part of the property was to go to certain relatives and the
remainder to an orphan asylum. The court held that to enlarge the
life estate into a fee, simply because a power of sale was appended,
would be to subvert the intention of the testator to a mere artificial
canon of construction. In Peckham v. Lego, 57 Conn. 553,
(-89o), a will gave to W. and his wife the use and improvement of
certain real estate during their natural lives, with the further pro-
visions that should it be necessary for their personal comfort to use
any portion of said property, it is my will that they should do so
exercising good judgment, and saving as much as possible for the
children born to them. The court held that the estate taken was
only for life.
In Silly. White, 62 Conn. 430, (189o), in which the testatrix
gave to A. all her property for life, with a right to use whatever was
necessary for his support, and the remainder over, the life estate was
not enlarged into a fee, the court saying there was no rule of law
which converted a life estate, expressly created, into a fee absolute
or qualified, or into any other form of estate greater than a life
estate, by reason of there being coupled with it a power of sale.
The case of Smith v. Bell, 6 Peters 68, (1843), in the United
States Supreme Court, the opinion being by Chief Justice Marshall,
is a good illustration of the third of these principles. The provis-
ions of the will was as follows: "I give to my wife all my personal
estate, wherever and whatsoever, and of what- nature and kind
soever, after payment of my debts, legacies, and funeral expenses,
which personal state I give and bequeath unto my said wife Eliza-
beth Goodwin, to and for her own use and disposal absolutely," the
remainder after her decease to be for the use of Jesse Goodwin, the
son of the testator. Held, that the wife took a life estate and the
son a vested remainder in the personalty.
The decision was vested on the ground that the intention of the
testator was to make a present provision for his wife, and a future
provision for his son.
In Chasev. Zadd, 153 Mass. 126 (i89i) the testator devised all
his property to his wife, to her own use and behoof forever, but
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provided that if any of such property should not be" expended for
her support and maintenance during her lifetime, it should be dis-
posed of in the manner designated in the will. The court decided
that, such a provision only vested a life estate in the wife. The
case shows that although almost unlimited control may be given
over property, it does not vest a fee simple.
The courts in deciding all these cases have always used the int~n-
of the testator as the polar star to direct their interpretation. But
none of the cases so decided, except the last, correspond in any
great degree with the case under discussion. In the present case
there is no express limitation of a life estate. Neither is there any
express grant of a fee, as in Church v. Harris, supra. Following
the language of the devise up the words "to be used and appropri-
ated by her," the effect is undoubtedly to give an absolute estate.
But, when the testator adds "as much as she may wish for her
happiness, "-the intention to limit the grant to a life estate begins.
to manifest itself, and the subsequent words of the will only make-
that intent more clear.
Accordingly the decision seems to be in accord with the estab-
lished principles governing such cases.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The Supreme Court of the United
States has recently decided, in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U. S. 537 (1896), that legislative provision, by a state, requiring
for its colored citizens separate railroad cars, in which they are
compelled to travel, under pain of fine and imprisonment, is con-
stitutional and valid.
The case arose out of a statute of Louisiana, enacted in i8go,
compelling companies to provide separate cars or compartments for
colored and white persons, and making it a criminal offence for the
officers of the railroad companies to fail to show persons into the-
car intended for their respective races, or for such persons to go
into a car other than that designated by the official of the company-
The plaintiff, a colored man, appealed from the criminal district
court, where he was about to be sentenced for a breach of the
statute, on the ground that it is inconsistent with the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
The case is rendered the more interesting, as the question has
never been before the court precisely in this form.
The court gives but slight consideration to the bearing of the
Thirteenth Amendment on the case, for the reason that it merely
abolished involuntary servitude, and the fact of a person's having
to ride in a separate, but equally comfortable car, is not servitude
in any sense. Mr. Justice Harlan, however, feels that even this.
constitutes a "badge of slavery," and, hence, is inconsistent with
the amendment.
But it is on the Fourteenth Amendment that the plaintiff chiefly
relies. This amendment provides that "1 no state shall make or
enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges or immunities.
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,of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
:person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the law."
With this amendment in view, the court decides the case on two
broad principles. The first is that while the constitution contem-
plates equality before the law, it cannot create social equality for
two races radically different. By social equality is meant the plac-
ing them on the same footing, and regulating to that end their
actions, in the casual and natural relations of the two races. The
court justly says that any such equality must grow out of a com-
mingling of the two races prompted by a mutual appreciation of
each others' worth.
That the constitution recognizes legal equality, witness the fre-
quent decisions that statutes, limiting to white males the privilege
of sitting upon juries, are unconstitutional, as stamping the negro
with a legal inferiority in civil society, and as a step towards reduc-
ing him to a state of slavery : Ex parte Virginia, ioo U. S. 313
(1879) ; Nfealv. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (188o) ; Gibson v.
.Miss., 162 U. S. 565 (1896).
On the other hand, as illustrative of social *questions, with which
the constitution has nothing to do, take the long line of cases
deciding that a state has the power, under the constitution, to.
establish separate schools for white and black children, and to com-
pel the races either to attend their own schools or remain without
school privileges. The cases hold that the colored children are
entitled to equal privileges with the white, but not to identical
privileges. This has been repeatedly decided by the state courts:
.State, Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 210 (1871): Schew v.
Brimmell, 103 Mo. 546 (i89o); Ward v. Flod, 48 Cal. 36
(x874) ; People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438 (1883) ; .Dawson v.
-Lee, 83 Ky. 49 (1885).
It will be asked, if these rights arising out of civil, as distinguished
from legal relations, are not within the purview of the constitution,
how are they to be adjusted. Here the court lays down its second
determining principle, viz.: that the Fourteenth Amendment draws
a distinction between citizenship of the United States (Slaughter
House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1872)), and citizenship of the states,
and that the former rights are those of citizens of the states, and
hence are to be regulated by the legislature in the exercise of its
police power.
The dissenting opinion, however, ridicules this view, holding
that if this were the case, there would remain no means by which
the courts could reach the most violent abuses which may be sanc-
tioned by the legislatures. The reply is that the police power is
founded on the reasonable provision for the health, good order, and
convenience of society, and that the moment the legislature goes
beyond the bounds of reasonableness, the courts may take a hand to
stop the abuse. Mr. Justice Harlan contends, very rightly, that a
court cannot set aside a statute because impolitic or unreasonable,
but only because unconstitutional, but he fails to notice the fact as.
stated by the majority, that the moment a police regulation becomes
unreasonable, it is Oso facto unconstitutional, and therefore, has.
always been recognized that the courts have a corrective power over
ill-directed policing by the legislature: H. &- St. r R. Co. v.
Hiusen, 95 U. S. 465 (1877) ; 1. &- _N R. Co. v. Ky., 161 U. S.
677 (1896) ; Hulseman v. Rems, 41 Pa. 396 (1861).
The court thus leaves the way open for correcting any abuses that
may arise, while at the same time it distinctly holds that the con-
stitution deals not with the social and civil standing of citizens, but
with their rights before the law. It is difficult to see how the court
could have held otherwise, after its definition of citizenship in the
Slaughter House Cases (supra). The action in this case is certainly
consistent with the rulings of th& state courts on analogous ques-
tions, and involves the principle that the court cannot read into a.
constitutional provision ideas which are not expressed. The decis-
ion cannot have the bad effects prophesied for it by Mr. Justice
Harlan, who believes it as iniquitous as the Dred Scott Decision,
but, we believe, except for the single definite point at issue, leaves
the question of the civil rights and status of the negro in general
still to be determined.
VENDOR'S LIEN FOR PURCHASE MONEY. A recent case in the
Supreme Court of Oregon, Frame v. Sliter, 45 Pac. Rep. 290,
decides that where real estate is granted by absolute deed, followed
by delivery of possession to the grantee, no implied equitable lien
for the unpaid purchase money remains in the grantor.
"No other single topic belonging to the equity jurisprudence has
occasioned such a diversity and even discord of opinion among the
American courts as this of the grantor's lien. Upon nearly every
question that has arisen as to its operation, its waiver or discharge,
the parties against whom it avails, and the parties in whose favor it
exists, the decisions in the different states and even sometimes in
the same state, are directly conflicting: 3 Por. Eq. Jur. §1251.
Mr. Bispham in his "Principles of Equity," 5 th ed. § 353,
arranges the states into three classes, first, those that following the
leading English case of Afactreth v. Symmons, 15 Vesey, 329, 1
Lead. Cases Eq. 447 ( 4 th Am. Ed.), hold that "where a vendor
delivers possession of an estate to a purchaser, without receiving the
purchase money, equity, whether the estate be conveyed or only
contracted to be conveyed, and although there was not any special
agreement for that purpose, gives the vendor a lien upon the land
for the unpaid purchase money;" second, those in which the
doctrine has been repudiated; third, those in which the doctrine
has been displaced by statute. An examination of these classes will
show that, so far as numerical authority is concerned, they stand in
the order named. In the second class will be found among others,
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.
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In Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheaton, 46, Marshall, C. J.,
impliedly admitted that a lien existed when he said: "That a ven-
dor who has taken no other security for the purchase money, retains
a lien for it on the land as against the vendee or his heirs, seems to
be well settled by the English decisions." But this must be treated
as a dictum, because the question at bar was whether the lien
would prevail against a bona fde purchaser without notice, and the
learned Chief Justice decided that it would not, and, further, took
occasion to criticize the lien for being "a secret invisible trust."
However, all doubt as to the position of the Federal courts has
been removed by the case of Fisher v. Shop shire, 13 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 201, in which Chief Justice Fuller says: "The courts of the
United States enforce grantors' and vendors' liens if in harmony
with the jurisprudence of the state in which the action is brought,
and the principle upon which such a lien rests has been held to be
that one who gets the estate of another ought not, in conscience, to
be allowed to keep it without paying the consideration: " Chilton
v. Brailen's Admx.., 2 Black, 458; See also Bush v. Mfarshall,
6 Howard, 284; Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wallace, 5; Rice v. Rice,
36 Fed. Rep. 86o.
The Pennsylvania lav upon the subject is found in the case of
A74tiffelt v. Bower, 7 .S. & R. 64, together with the later cases of
JVeas's Appeal, 31 Pa. 293; Heister v. Green, 48 Pa. 96, and
Heist v. Baker, 49 Pa. 9. In the first mentioned case, Gibson,
J., used the following language: "The decision of the principal
question whether an equitable lien for purchase money can exist in
Pennsylvania, under any circumstances, will render a decision of
most of, if not all, other questions raised, unnecessary. I have
given this question that deliberate consideration which the great
importance of its practical consequences deserves, and the result is
a settled conviction that, with us, such a lien does not exist."
Interpreting the words used by the learned judge in their strictly
technical character, that is, taking the words "equitable lien" to
mean a lien as of grace and not a lien created by words used in the
deed, we find, that the law of Pennsylvania to-day is true to
]iaufelt v. Bower. The court, in Neas's Appeal, supira, appar-
ently departed from the principle laid down in Kauffelt v. Bower,
but in reality they only decided that the words in the deed showed
an intention to create a lien upon the land. However, in Hister
v. Green, supra, Woodward, C. J., who had dissented in Neas's
Appeal, said: "The sum of the authorities is that though equitable
liens are not favored by our law, yet parties may by clear and
express words in deeds of conveyance create liens upon land either
for purchase money, or for performance of collateral conditions,
which will be binding between themselves and their privies, and
such liens will be divested by subsequent sheriff's sales unless they
are in the nature of testamentary provision for wives and children,
or are not capable of valuation, or are expressly created to run with
the land ..... .In Neas's Ap pealan intention to create a lien was
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inferred from the fact that the purchase money stood in the title.
But according to all the antecedent cases express words were
necessary to establish the lien. It never before was treated as a
subject for legal implication, and it is manifestly a hazardous infer-
ence to make."
The case of Heist v. Baker is interesting, because in affirming
the decision of the lower court, Woodward, C. J., stated that the
case was the very reverse of Heister v. Green, an authority which
the appellant had supposed to be in his favor. See also SemJple v.
Burd, 7 S. & R. 286 ; Afegargalv. Saul, 3 Whart. i ; Wilhelmn v.
.Fu]ner, 6 Pa. 296; Zenhmeer v. lfiltower, 5 Pa. 403; Stephens'
APP. 38 Pa. 9 ; CmrY v. B0ol4 53 Pa. 400. Where the words
have been sufficient to create a lien, see Strauss' App. 49 Pa. 35 ;
Eichelberger v. Gilt, 104 Pa. 64.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT- 1ALICIOUS PROSECUTION-CoNFLICT OF
LAWS. The Jfexican Central Railway Compani', Appellant, v.
Herbert B. Gehr, Appellee. App ellate Court, First District,
Illinois. Opinion filled July 1, 1896. Action on the case by
appellee against appellant. The first and second counts allege a
malicious prosecution, the third and fourth, a false imprisonment.
The trial resulted in a $4,000 verdict for the plaintiff.
The facts of the case, as well as the legal principals involved, are
interesting. The former are briefly as follows: The appellant is a
Massachusetts corporation operating a railway in Mexico with
offices in the city of Mexico, where the grievances occurred. The
appellee, a citizen of Illinois, was employed by appellant as assistant
paymaster. On June .17, 189o, a package containing between
eight and nine thousand dollars was missed from the paymaster's
safe. The loss being discovered, one Jackson, general manager of
the appellant's affairs in Mexico, and the assistant treasurer, named
Browne, ordered the doors of the room in which the appellee and
five others were congregated to be locked, and no one allowed
either to depart or enter. Jackson and Browne went to police head-
quarters, and returned with the Chief of Police and three other
officers. After a secret conference between Jackson, Browne and
the officials, Browne returned to the locked room, and, pointing to
the Chief of Police, said to the appellee: "You- will have to go
with this man," the appellee obeying. He was taken to the police
station where he remained for twenty-four hours until examined by
the Second Criminal Court of Mexico, and then was imprisoned
for eight weeks in a noisome state prison of that country. On
August 14, 189 o , he was discharged, the attorney for the state
having stated that in his judgment the facts taken into considera-
tion for decreeing his arrest had disappeared. On appellee's return
to Chicago the suit was brought in the Circuit Court.
The jurisdiction of the American Court over the offence com-
mitted in Mexico is clear. It was proved at the trial that false
imprisonment is a redressible offence in Mexico, as well as in the
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United States, and consequently the case was cognizable by an
American Court: Webb's Pollock on Torts, p. 238; C. &' N W
Ry. Co. v. Tulde, 44 Ill. App. 535.
The court was unanimous as to jurisdiction, but Justice Water-
man dissented as to that portion of the appellee's alleged false
imprisonment which occurred after the hearing before the Mexican
Court. There can be no question but that the detention of the
appellee in the room with five others, two of whom were guards in
the employ of the appellant, amounted to imprisonment. The
doors were not locked so as to prevent egress, but the presence of the
guards, together with the order from Jack-on, were sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to find, as they did, that it was natural for the
appellant to believe that any attempt on his part to leave would
have been prevented. To constitute false imprisonment physical
detention is not necessary. The law is well stated in Coin. v.
Knowles, 17 Kan. 436, as follows: "Nor is it necessary that the
act be committed with malice or ill-will. All that is necessary is
that the individual be restrained of his liberty, without sufficient
legal cause thereof, and bi' words or acts which he fears to dis-
regard:" Akin v. Newall, 32 Ark. 316 ; Ahern v. Collins, 39
Mo. 151; .2"c Jay, v. Straton, 9 Ill. App. 215 ; Fuller v. Bowke,
ii Mich. 204; Gold v. Bissell, i Wend. 210; Brushaker v.
Stagemann, 22 Mich. 266 ; Afoses v. Dubois, Dudley, (S. C.)
209.
The question whether the appellant should have been held liable
for the incarceration after the hearing before the Mexican Court
presents greater difficulty. It was shown at the trial that accord-
ing to the laws of Mexico "any person making a charge of a
crime against a designated person may become a party to the pro-
ceedings and actively assist therein." It was found by the jury that
Jackson, the appellant's manager, did so designate the appellee, and
that the appellant's attorney was afterwards concerned in the hear-
ing before the Second Mexican Criminal Court. On this ground
it was decided by the majority of the court that the appellant was
liable for the whole eight weeks' imprisonment. Just what part
the appellant's attorney took in the hearing was not ascertained nor
was it shown that the Mexican Court was influenced in its decision
by any acts or words on the part of the appellant's servants. It
seems, therefore, that the majority of the court were wrong in
holding the appellant liable for the imprisonment subsequent to the
hearing. In the United States damages for false imprisonment can-
not be recovered against an informant when the imprisonment com-
plained of took place after hearing before and by order of a judi-
cial tribunal: Webb's Pollock on Torts, 265-267 ; Zark v. Bande,
4 Mo. App. 186; Johnson v. AMorton, 94 Mich. 1-6. Where one
wrongfully causes the arrest of another, and that one is imprisoned
by a magistrate or other judicial tribunal, he is liable in a suit for
false imprisonment only for the imprisonment prior to the judicial
proceedings. The rest is by judicial authority, and the injured
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person can only obtain redress through a suit for malicious prosecu-
tion : Lea v. Char-ing/on, 23 Q. B. Div. 45 ; Aneman v. Jones,
116 Ind. 41-45. It was not shown that the Mexican Law was dif-
ferent from that just stated, or that the Second Mexican Criminal
Court is a ministerial and not a judicial tribunal. On the contrary,
it is clear from the evidence that that court's functions are judicial.
Justice Waterman's dissenting opinion, therefore, seems to be the
better one, and the majority of the court erroneous in holding the
appellant liable in a suit for false imprisonment for the incarcera-
tion which was ordered by the criminal court, and which took
place after the hearing before that tribunal.
While two of the counts in the declaration alleged a malicious
prosecution, the elements of that offence, notably malice and lack
of reasonable and probable cause, were not present nor was that
remedy relied upon by the appellee.
MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT. The cases of Allen
v. Jackson, now waiting judgment in the House of Lords, (reported
below as Flood v. Jackson [1895], 2 Q. B. 21 ; Lyons v. Wilkins,
i Ch. 811 (1896); and Exchange Tel. Co. v. Gregory [1896],
i Q. B. 147, suggest a short consideration of the law on this im-
portant topic.
Generally speaking, a person has neither rights nor liabilities under
a contract to which he is not a party. Though a stranger to the
original contract, he may acquire rights under it, as for example,
by the laws of agency, by assignment or operation of law, or where
there is in fact the relationship of trustee and ces/i que trust. On
the other hand, allowing for the exception of certain classes of con-
tracts in certain jurisdictions, the duty-which Sir William Anson
distinguishes from obligation or liability-is imposed upon third
parties, extraneous to an obligation, to abstain from malicious
efforts to induce one of two parties to a contract to break it, to the
damage of the other.
In England, owing to a statute (Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw.
3), it has been held redressible from early times to entice a servant
from his master, with knowledge of the relationship of master and
servant: See Lumleyv. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216 (1853). In this well-
known case the damage complained of consisted in inducing to
appear elsewhere one under contract to sing only in the plaintiff's
theatre. Two questions were before the court: (i) Would an
action lie for procuring such a breach? (2) Is the Statute of
Labourers applicable? The majority of the court answered both
questions in the affirmative. Coleridge, C. J.. dissented; and
while the majority are to be followed in their answer to the first
question before them, certainly Coleridge's refusal to apply to an
opera singer a statute probably designed for manual laborers,
deserves respectful attention. And if the doctrine is not dependent
on the Statute of Labourers, why should recovery be limited to
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-cases of personal service? Should it not rather in any event rest
-on the right to freedom from oppression and malicious mischief?
The American case of Cronin v. Walker, 107 Mass. 555 (1871),
followed Lumley v. Gye. There shoemakers were induced to quit
-service, and the court held that the doctrine under consideration
"applies to all contracts of employment, if not to contracts of
-every description: " (page 567).
Subsequently, perceiving that in contractual matters one's com-
fort and right to freedom from oppression should not be limited to
-cases of contract for personal service, in a few cases the same rule -
was extended to other kinds of contracts ihan those for personal
service: Jones v. Stanly, 76 N. C. 355 (x877) ; Angle v. Ry. i5UJ. S. 1 (1893).
Of the cases refusing to extend the rule beyond contracts for
personal services, Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 325 (1883), is one
of those most frequently cited. " In that case the defendant threat-
ened to discharge from his service any one who lived in the plaint-
iff's house, in consequence of which the then tenant vacated.
There was, however, no lease for a fixed term, so that no existing
-contract was broken, and no damages could be recovered. The
question of recovery, because of the particular relationship, was not
the principal one before the court. See, fiowever, Rice v. Albee,
164 Mass. 88 (1895) ; also, Anson on Contracts, Second American
Edition, 211 note, and 35 Albany L. J., p. 224, for collection of
:authorities.
As to the elements essential to recovery:
Where the decision depends on the application of the Statute of
Labourers, knowledge of the relationship of master and servant is
-perhaps all that is necessary to permit recovery: Bigelow on Torts,
Sixth Edition, p. io8. In other cases the presence of malice is
considered essential to the right of action. Malice, where one
induces another to break his contract, has been defined to be the
-use of such persuasion "for the indirect purpose of injuring the
plaintiff, or of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the
-plaintiff." Brett, L. J., in Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. Div. 338
(x88i). This has been said to mean in general that the act was
done without just cause or lawful excuse. "Every one has a right
to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterlirise, skill and
-credit. He has no right to be protected against competition; but
he has a right to be free from malicious and wanton interference,
disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss comes . . .
-from the merely wanton or malicious act of others, without the
justification of competition or the service of any interest or lawful
purpose, it then is unlawful: Bigelow on Torts, Sixth Edition, p.
i1o, note.
It has also been held necessary to recovery that actual damage be•
shown. But in the late case of Exchange Telegraph Co. v. Greg-
.ory, cited at the head of this note, a step in advance is taken, the
rule being laid down that no special damage need be proved; but
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that it is sufficient if the natural consequence of the malicious
inducement of the breach, successfully accomplished, be to cause
damage to the plaintiff.
The courts have been loth to extend the doctrine to cases of
interference with contracts not already formed, but merely in con-
templation. In one class of cases, however, a greater willingness is
shown to make such an extension, namely in strikes and boycotts:
Temperon v. Russell, L. R. (1893), Q. B. 435.
In line with this come the cases of Allen v. Flood and Lyons v.
Wilkins, mentioned at the head of this note. In Allen v. Flood,
certain woodworkers and ironworkers were employed to work on a
ship. Discovering that the woodworkers had previously done iron-
work in the same yards, the ironworkers, through their district
delegate, informed the owner of the yards that unless he discharged
the woodworkers, they would leave his service. In consequence
the woodworkers were discharged. The court held that merely to
persuade a person to break his contract gives no cause of action,
and that one has a perfect right to advise another not to make a
contract ; but that if, in either case, the act was done maliciously,
the rule would be different. And the court held further that the jury
had rightly characterized as malicious, the act of the trade-union
delegate, in threatening injury to the employer's business, his motive
being to punish the woodworkers for the performance of a lawful
act, and to interfere with their liberty of earning their livelihood.
In Lyons v. Wilkins, where the Messrs. Wilkins, leather manufactu-
rers, refused on request to raise the wages of their workmen and
alter their system of employment, an attempt was made to get one
Schoenthal, a sub-manufacturer, who made goods for Messrs. Lyons,
to stop working for them. Failing also in this, a strike of Schoen-
thal's workmen was ordered. No complaint was made against him,
the object of the strike being to injure the Messrs. Lyons. The
court held that these facts constituted evidence of malice, and
granted an injunction restraining the union from preventing Schoen-
thal's furnishing goods to Messrs. Lyons, by withdrawing workmen
from their employment.
In this country also restraint by injunction is held to be an
appropriate remedy in cases of strikes and boycotts: Sherry v.
Perkins, 147 Mass. 212 (1888) ; Brace v. Evans, 3 Ry. & Corp.
L. J.. 56i ; Casey v. Cin. Typographical Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135
(189i); Coeur d 'Alene Jfizing Co. v. Miner's Union, 51 Fed.
Rep. 260 (1892); Bindell v. Hogan, 54 Fed. Rep. 40 (1893).
Conspicuous illustrations of interfefence by injunction are found in
recent railway cases: Toledo, Ann Arbor & N. A. Ry. Co. v.
Pa. Ry. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 730 (1893), where an injunction was
granted to restrain the Chief Executive of the Brotherhocd of
Locomotive Engineers from issuing or continuing in force any
rule or order of the Brotherhood requiring employees of any of the
defendant's railways to refuse to handle the complainant's freight
cars in the course of transportation from one state to another,
